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Using paper and pencil experiments administered in senior centers, we examine decision-making 
performance in multi-attribute decision problems. We find a significant decline in performance 
with age due to reduced reliance on common heuristics among our oldest subjects. Subjects in 
their early sixties incorporate a wide array of heuristics, septuagenarians employ progressively 
fewer strategies, and subjects in their 80s make nearly random selections. However, we find that 
increasing the number of options in a decision problem increases the number of heuristics 
brought to the task. This challenges the choice overload view that people give up when 
confronted with too much choice. 
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I.  Introduction 
Virtually all consumer choices, be they among retirement savings plans, health care plans, or 
brands of shampoo, involve choosing among alternatives characterized by sets of attributes. An 
extensive literature demonstrates that the quality of and satisfaction with choices generally 
decline as the number of options increases (e.g., Payne et al. 1993, Iyengar and Lepper 2000, 
Schram and Sonnemans 2011, Tanius et al. 2009). Researchers have hypothesized that this effect 
is due to choice overload; when facing a multitude of options, “rather than even try, people may 
disengage, choosing almost arbitrarily” (Schwartz et al. 2002, p. 1179). Recently, Besedeš et al. 
(2010) measured decision-making accuracy in complex tasks in an online experiment and 
confirmed that decision-making performance decreases as the number of available options 
increases. Besedeš et al. (2010) also report that older subjects use suboptimal problem-solving 
approaches, or heuristics, when compared to younger subjects, leading to objectively worse 
choices with age.  
Past work has shown two contrasting effects of aging on decision-making. First, cognitive 
functions physically decline with age (Cerella 1985, Mittenberg et al. 1989, Zimprich and Martin 
2002, Gilchrist et al. 2008, Goldberg 2009). Second, older individuals employ different 
heuristics in their approach to solving problems (Cole and Balasubramanian 1993, Johnson 1993, 
Yoon et al. 2009). For example, seniors generally consider a smaller information set prior to 
making decisions and rely more on deductive than on inductive strategies as compared with 
younger people (Meyer et al. 1995, Zwahr et al. 1999). Neurologically, seniors involve both 
hemispheres of the brain in decision making, unlike younger adults who generally use either the 
left or the right side depending on the task (Cabeza 2002). Despite cognitive decline, these 
heuristic adaptations can lead to improved performance with age in some cases (Stern and 
Carstensen 2000, Scheibe and Blanchard-Fields 2009).  3 
 
We present the results of paper and pencil experiments conducted at senior citizen activity 
centers in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In-person experiments may provide a more representative 
sample of seniors than the online format of our related study (Besedeš et al. 2010). In both 
studies, subjects completed a series of choice tasks, where they were presented with several 
options and asked to select one. Each option contained several attributes, corresponding to a 
probability of receiving a payment, thus enabling us to evaluate objectively the relative quality of 
a subject’s choices. The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we differentiate the effect of 
declining cognitive performance and changing cognitive process on decision-making 
performance of seniors as they age. Second, we test the behavioral hypothesis of choice 
overload, examining whether seniors give up when facing too many options. 
Our data suggest that younger seniors perform substantially better than those over the age 
of 75. Younger seniors also employ a wide array of problem-solving strategies. With increasing 
age, we find a decline in performance and a reliance on fewer problem-solving strategies, with 
the oldest subjects making decisions that are closer to random guessing than to optimal choices. 
However, among seniors as a whole, we find a moderating effect of increasing the number 
of options. Rather than suffering from choice overload and simply leaving a choice to chance 
when faced with a multitude of options, seniors incorporate more heuristics as task complexity 
increases. While seniors are less likely to identify the best option from an increasing number of 
options, they are substantially more likely to identify a good option, defined as the top quartile of 
all options. We find that increased choice complexity leads to a reliance on a greater number of 
heuristic strategies used to eliminate bad choices from consideration.  
II.  Experiment Design 
Subjects participated in a series of 19 decision tasks. In each task, subjects are asked to select 
one option from among a number of options that is most likely to include a single randomly-4 
 
selected attribute. Attributes are denoted in literal terms as colored balls, with the frequency 
distribution among colors given for each task. For example, Figure 1 illustrates a four option, 
four attribute choice task. Here, an urn would be filled with 100 colored balls: 28 lime, 24 pink, 
26 white, and 22 green. One randomly drawn ball would determine whether the subject receives 
$50 if the selected option includes the drawn attribute and $15 if it does not. In this case, option 
A is the best choice; it includes the lime, pink, and green attributes, for a total of 74 of the 100 
balls and thus a 74% chance of earning the larger payoff. This design (similar to Besedeš et al. 
2010) ensures that all individuals have the same preferences over options, governed by the total 
probability of payment.  
Figure 1: Sample choice task
BALLS # 
OPTIONS 
Circle the letter option of your choice. 
A B C D 
Lime 28         
Pink 24       
White 26         
Green 22         
 
Each subject was presented with a choice booklet and a survey booklet. Once subjects 
select an option in each task, one task is randomly selected to determine the subject’s payment. 
Each subject is initially endowed with $50. If the color of the drawn ball was included among the 
attributes of the subject’s chosen option, the subject did not incur a loss. Otherwise, the subject 
incurred a loss of $35. As the experiment was conducted in a loss frame, our subjects were 
essentially choosing among free insurance plans (or prescription drug plans) that completely 
covered some events (or medications) but not others. 
The task booklet began with one simple task designed to familiarize subjects with the 
experiment, followed by the 18 main tasks constituting a 3×3×2 within-subject design. The first 5 
 
dimension denotes the number of options (4, 8, or 12), the second denotes the number of 
attributes (4, 8, or 12 colors of balls), and the third denotes the probability distribution over 
attributes. Presumably, the value of having more choice is the greater likelihood of a better 
option. Thus, the best option had a higher payoff in tasks with more options. Under the first 
probability distribution, PDF 1, which maintains similar probabilities for each attribute, the best 
option improves slightly, from a payoff of 74 to 76 to 78, as the number of options increases 
from 4 to 8 to 12. Under PDF 2, which has some attributes associated with substantially higher 
probability than others, the best option improves from a payoff of 56 to 81 to 92. The addition of 
attributes preserves the expected payoff of each option, akin to providing additional detail while 
not affecting the decision itself. This is achieved by splitting the probability of existing attributes. 
For example, 28 “Lime” balls in the 4-attribute case could be divided into 18 lime and 10 purple 
balls, where options that did (not) cover lime in the 4-attribute case do (not) cover lime and 
purple. The full experimental design is presented in Table 1, while the appendix shows the 
instructions.
2  
Three versions of the choice booklet varied the order of the 18 tasks. Subjects were 
instructed not to go backwards in the booklet and compliance was monitored. After completing 
the tasks, subjects were instructed to close their task booklet and proceed to the survey booklet. 
The survey collected information on demographics, risky behavior, analytical ability, and 
experience. A total of 65 subjects participated in the hour-long experiment. 
III.  Results 
We begin with a summary of performance by both demographics and task characteristics in 
Table 2. We examine performance across several demographic groups defined by age quartiles 
(60-67, 68-74, 75-79, or 80+ years), education (high school only, some college or college degree, 
or post-graduate education), sex, race, income (median split of less/more than $40k) and number
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of children (median split of 0-3 or >4). The first column presents the frequency with which 





(in Top 25%) Efficiency  N 
Overall  38% 58% 51%  65 
By Demographic Characteristics 
Age  60-67 48% 66% 60%  17 
68-74 48% 68% 68%  17 
75-79 26% 46% 38%  15 
80+ 28% 48% 35%  16 
Education  At most high  school 28% 47% 33%  22 
Some college or degree 39%  59%  53%  28 
Graduate  education 51% 71% 72%  15 
Sex  Female 37% 58% 52%  48 
Male 40% 55% 47%  17 
Race  African-American 30% 50% 45%  11 
White and other 40%  59%  52%  54 
Income  Less than 40k 39%  60%  54%  38 
Income more than 40k 36%  54%  47%  27 
Children  Three or fewer 37%  57%  49%  39 
More than three 39%  58%  53%  26 
 
By Task Characteristics 
Options  4 46% 46% 51%  65 
8 35% 66% 50%  65 
12 33% 61% 52%  65 
Attributes  4 43% 58% 54%  65 
8 36% 56% 48%  65 
12 35% 58% 51%  65 
PDFs  1 47% 66% 58%  65 
2 29% 49% 44%  65 
 
Table 2: Choice frequency and efficiency 
 
Subjects in the youngest two age quartiles select the optimal option in nearly half of all 
tasks. Subjects over 75 years of age do significantly worse, selecting the optimal option about 
one quarter of the time. The likelihood of selecting the optimal option increases with education, 
and is generally lower for African American subjects. Sex, income, and the number of children 8 
 
have negligible effects on the frequency of selecting the optimal option. Task characteristics 
indicate that the frequency of optimal choice declines with task complexity. Increasing either the 
number of options or the number of attributes leads to a reduced likelihood of selecting the 
optimal option. Additionally, PDF 1 encourages better decisions than PDF 2.  
Less frequent selection of the optimal option as the number of options increases is not 
surprising. Any random component to the decision-making process would yield a 25% chance of 
identifying the optimal option in the 4-option case, but only an 8% chance in the 12-option case. 
The second column of Table 1 examines the likelihood of selecting a Good option, which we 
define as an option in the top 25% of the choice set (1 of 4, 2 of 8, or 3 of 12). Overall, these 
Good options have an average expected payoff in the experiment of $36.50, while the remaining 
options have an expected payoff of $21.50. Additionally, the worst Good option has an expected 
payoff that is $6 higher than the next-best option. The frequency of selecting a Good option 
exhibits very similar demographic effects to the selection of the optimal option, decreasing with 
age and increasing with education. Under random decision making, the frequency of selecting a 
Good option would remain constant at 25% as the number of options increases from 4 to 8 to 12. 
However, we find that subjects selected a Good option with an increasing frequency as the 
number of options increases, from 46% with four options to 61% with 12 options. This again 
argues against choice overload. 
We next examine whether choices are closer to random or optimal decision-making. The 
expected payoffs of chosen options are not directly comparable across different tasks as the number and 
quality of options varies. We define a standardized measure of decision efficiency as  
options   all   of   payoff   expected   average    option     optimal   of   payoff   expected
options   all   of   payoff   expected   average    option   chosen    of   payoff   expected
   


 efficiency  
Thus, efficiency equals 0 if the subject’s expected payoff is equal to what would be yielded by a 
random choice and equals 1 if the maximum expected payoff is achieved. Overall, younger 9 
 
seniors achieve above 60% efficiency, while older seniors are below 40%. This implies that the 
payoffs of older seniors are closer to random choice than to optimal choice. We find little effect 
on efficiency of increasing task complexity, either through more options or attributes. Thus, 
while we find evidence that older subjects are closer to random decision making, increasing task 
complexity does not worsen the decision making of seniors as a whole.  
We estimate probit and OLS models to better understand the determinants of optimal 
decision making (Table 3). We include task characteristics and demographic characteristics 
described above, as well as several additional determinants of cognition and risk. Following 
Dohmen et al. (2010) we asked subjects the percentage of $100,000 lottery winnings they would 
invest in an asset that is equally likely to double or halve over the next year as a way of  
measuring risk attitudes, and coded responses as above or below a median 40% investment. As 
an additional measure of risk, we asked subjects if they are users of tobacco (Viscusi and Hersch 
2001). We also surveyed subjects as to whether they regularly gamble in casino or play lottery 
games. Since games of chance revolve around probabilities, regular players may have a better 
understanding of probabilities than non-players. In addition, we include two measures of 
problem solving acumen. As a measure of mathematical inclination, we asked subjects a series of 
five arithmetic questions and include the number of right answers as “math count correct.” To 
gauge cognitive inclination, we included the number of correct answers to the three-question 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) of Frederick (2005). The CRT questions have intuitive answers 
that are easily seen to be incorrect upon reflection.   
The results of the regressions confirm the insights apparent in Table 2. Age has a highly 
significant negative effect on decision making. Attending college leads to a weak improvement 
in performance while graduate school attendance leads to a significant improvement (p<0.01) by 
all measures. Members of the lower income group perform significantly better than the higher  
 10 
 
Optimal Option  Good Option 
(in Top 25%)  Efficiency        
(probit) (probit)  (OLS) 
Demographic Characteristics 
Age  -0.044*** -0.039*** -0.019*** 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) 
College  0.261* 0.311* 0.158 
(0.150) (0.182) (0.097) 
Graduate  0.742*** 0.867*** 0.394*** 
(0.177) (0.214) (0.123) 
Male  0.131 -0.092 -0.052 
(0.150) (0.189) (0.106) 
African-American -0.360** -0.384*  -0.071 
(0.170) (0.209) (0.132) 
Income  over  $40,000  -0.535*** -0.555*** -0.250*** 
(0.136) (0.185) (0.092) 
Children > 3  0.285**  0.269*  0.149* 
(0.119) (0.144) (0.084) 
Task Characteristics 
8 options  -0.320***  0.605***  -0.009 
(0.097) (0.101) (0.052) 
12 options  -0.382***  0.438***  0.006 
(0.107) (0.095) (0.052) 
8 attributes  -0.221**  -0.062  -0.051 
(0.094) (0.082) (0.036) 
12 attributes  -0.233***  -0.021  -0.026 
(0.084) (0.069) (0.037) 
PDF  2  0.516*** 0.512*** 0.144*** 
(0.095) (0.117) (0.040) 
Cognition & Risk 
Never used tobacco  0.087  0.055  -0.017 
(0.138) (0.174) (0.095) 
Securities over 40%  -0.025  -0.084  -0.020 
(0.138) (0.152) (0.086) 
Gambling 0.363**  0.483***  0.232** 
(0.151) (0.184) (0.111) 
Math count correct  0.022  0.054  0.066 
(0.069) (0.080) (0.040) 
CRT count correct  0.136  0.061  -0.003 
(0.148) (0.154) (0.061) 
Constant 2.623***  2.170**  1.528** 
(0.768) (0.986) (0.599) 
Observations               1,170               1,170               1,155 
log likelihood  -670.8  -679.2  -1103.0 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses 
Table 3: Regressions for optimal choice and choice efficiency 
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income group by all three measures.
3 People with more than three children performed better 
(p<0.1 for all measures), perhaps reflecting a lifetime of experience navigating tough choices. 
Among the cognition and risk markers, the only clearly significant marker is experience with 
gambling and games of chance, where respondents performed better by all measures (p<0.05). 
  Regarding task characteristics, additional options or attributes greatly reduce the chance 
of selecting the optimal option,. Neither the number of options nor the number of attributes has a 
significant effect on efficiency, or overall performance. However, increasing the number of 
options increases the chance of selecting a Good option. We next examine how the use of 
heuristics changes with age and task complexity. 
IV.  Evolving Heuristics 
Individuals may use various strategies in solving complex problems. We examine three often-
analyzed heuristics that are commonly used to make decisions among multi-attribute options: 
tallying, lexicographic, and undominated. Tallying discards probability information and simply 
sums the number of attributes for each option (Dawes 1979). Lexicographic favors options that 
include the most probable attribute (Keeney and Raiﬀa 1993). Undominated preserves options 
whose attributes are not strict subsets of other options (Montgomery 1983). Additionally, we 
include the probability of payoff as an indicator for optimal choice, and model the importance of 
each decision-making paradigm using McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model. All four 
decision rules are measured on a 0-1 scale. In Figure 1, Option B would have a measure of 0.48 
for payoffs (the total probability of its two attributes), 0.5 for tallying (as it covers half of the 
available attributes), 0 for lexicographic (as it does not cover the most likely attribute) and 1 for 
undominated (as its attributes are not a strict subset of another option). Option C would have 
measures of 0.5 for payoffs, 0.5 for tallying, 0.25 for lexicographic (as one of four consecutive 
                                                            
3 The notion of income for seniors may be subject to various interpretations (personal pre-retirement income, 
deceased spouse’s income or benefits, household pre-retirement income, current personal income, etc.). 12 
 
most likely attributes is covered), and 0 for undominated (as its attributes are a proper subset of 
Option A).  
Besedeš et al. (2010) found seniors, as a group, rely primarily on tallying while younger 
groups use a broader range of heuristics. In Table 4, we estimate heuristics independently for 
each age quartile to ascertain whether the use of heuristics can account for the poorer 
performance by older seniors that we identified in the previous section. The youngest age 
quartile (60-67) employs all three strategies: tallying, lexicographic, and undominated, with 
significance in declining order. Subjects in the next age quartile no longer use undominated, 
while subjects in the third quartile exhibit only tallying as statistically significant. For subjects in 
the oldest group, no heuristic is significant. Overall, the youngest seniors show a breadth of 
heuristics more comparable to younger subjects in Besedeš et al. (2010), while the oldest group 
exhibits a greater propensity for undirected choice, in line with the efficiency measures from 
Table 2 which indicated choices closer to random than optimal. The negative effect of age on 
decision making is due to subjects progressively discarding heuristics in decision making as they 
age, ultimately leading to decision making based more on guessing than any common criteria. 
 
60-67 68-74 75-79  80+ 
Payoff  -0.340 2.040  -0.055 0.945 
(1.763) (1.123) (1.285) (0.907) 
Tallying 3.622***  4.233***  3.467*  1.681 
(1.085) (0.921) (1.357) (1.024) 
Lexicographic 2.681** 1.806** 0.276  1.010 
(0.929) (0.652) (0.725) (0.907) 
Undominated 0.825* 0.324  0.289  0.292 
    (0.334) (0.240) (0.214) (0.227) 
Log  Likelihood  -452.5 -419.6 -471.7 -493.6 
Observations  2444 2428 2160 2196 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses 
Table 4: Age-specific heuristics estimated by conditional logit 
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We next examine the choice overload hypothesis that people give up in the face of more 
options, devolving to random choice. Above, we noted that the probability of selecting a Good 
option increases with the number of options. This is inconsistent with choice overload as the 
probability of selecting a Good option under random decision making is constant in our 
experiment. A more direct test estimates the heuristics used for each set of tasks with the same 
number of options, 4, 8, and 12. If the choice overload explanation is correct, we should see 
subjects devolving to random choice as the number of options increases, effectively relying on 
fewer heuristics as task complexity increases. In fact, we observe the opposite (Table 5). With 
four options, subjects rely solely on tallying, the only significant heuristic. With 8 options, while 
tallying remains the strongest heuristic, undominated is also significant (p<0.05) and 
lexicographic is mildly significant (p<0.1). With 12 options, in addition to the always relied upon 
tallying, lexicographic becomes highly significant (p<0.01). Rather than decreasing the number 
of used heuristics as the number of options increases, as one would expect given the choice 
overload hypothesis, our subjects actually begin to use additional heuristics. 
 
4 options  8 options  12 options 
Payoff 1.264  0.984  -0.687 
(1.066) (1.084) (0.866) 
Tallying  2.681*** 2.988*** 5.185*** 
(0.626) (0.639) (1.074) 
Lexicographic 1.170  1.559*  1.794*** 
(1.062) (0.716) (0.470) 
Undominated 0.245  0.616** 0.100 
    (0.310) (0.193) (0.222) 
Log Likelihood  -437.8  -641.7  -789.6 
Observations 1544  3088  4596 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses 
Table 5: Task-specific heuristics estimated by conditional logit 
 
Given that tallying is conserved across all choices, we hypothesize that other heuristics are 
used primarily to reduce the decision set to a manageable level. For example, one could 14 
 
concentrate only on options that cover the most likely attribute, or eliminate options that are 
clearly inferior to others in the choice set, thus applying aspects of lexicographic decision 
making or the elimination of dominated options. Thus, subjects may first employ elimination 
strategies (Iyengar and Lepper 2000, Timmermans 1993), and then utilize tallying to select 
among the remainder. We noted that the likelihood of selecting the best option declines as more 
options are introduced. However, undominated and lexicographic strategies are quite likely to 
eliminate the worst options (Payne et al. 1993). The increased use of these heuristics moderates 
the effects of task complexity and results in a higher likelihood of selecting a good option.  
V.  Conclusion 
Research on decision-making performance of seniors has clear and urgent implications for the 
quality of life of this growing segment of the population. It is also highly relevant to the 
disposition of trillions of dollars in retirement savings plans and the large annual cost of 
healthcare for seniors. In each of these arenas, seniors are confronted with a wide array of 
choices, from the many available prescription drug plans to the numerous mutual funds offered 
with savings plans. 
Conventional wisdom holds that people simply throw up their hands and give up when 
faced with too much choice. To the contrary, we find that seniors draw on additional heuristics to 
reduce the choice set to a manageable level and, in the process, are more likely to eliminate bad 
options than good ones. While increasing complexity does not as often lead to the optimal 
choice, it can lead to a good choice more often. 
In a variety of settings, prior research has shown older subjects consistently make worse 
decisions compared with younger subjects. Here, we show important age effects within a senior 
citizen subject pool in terms of both the strategies used to approach complex decisions and the 
efficiency of subject’s final choices. We find that performance abruptly declines in one’s mid to 15 
 
late 70s. Specifically, seniors rely upon fewer and fewer heuristics as they age until choices 
essentially become random guesses. These results demonstrate the need to provide assistance to 
seniors who are making complex decisions. This is an area in which more research is needed. 16 
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You are receiving $50 for participating in this experiment and completing a brief survey.  
The experiment consists of multiple tasks.  Each task requires the completion of a response form 
on which you will make a choice from a set of alternatives appearing in a table such as the one 
below.   
BALLS # 
OPTIONS 
Mark the letter option of your choice. 
A B C D E F 
Red 10             
Orange 30            
Yellow 60            
There will be a container of colored balls and one ball will be randomly drawn from the 
container at the end of the experiment.  A volunteer from BREC will conduct the drawing in 
front of you.  The column “BALLS” will list the colors of the balls in the container and the 
column “#” will list the number of balls of each color in the container.  There will always be a 
total of 100 balls.  Therefore, the chance that particular color will be drawn is the number of balls 
of that color /100.  In this example, there is a 30/100 = 30% chance that an orange ball will be 
drawn.   
Under the “OPTIONS” heading will be a set of letters.  The letters correspond to options 
that you may choose.  In the example on the previous page, one could choose option A, B, C, D, 
E, or F.  Each option contains a series of checkmarks corresponding to the colored balls.  For 
example, Option C has a checkmark for the color red only.  Option D has checkmarks for both 
red and yellow.   
For each task you will choose one and only one option by marking the letter of your choice 
with the provided marker.  If you make a mistake or wish to change your response, please raise 
your hand and inform an experimenter.  Marking multiple options will result in a loss of 
compensation.       
You will make choices for 19 tasks.  It is important that you make the choices in the order 
in which they are presented in the booklet.  That is, you must complete the tasks in order and 
once you complete a task you cannot go back to it.  Please do not go back to any previous pages. 19 
 
After you have made all of your choices, please close your booklet.  You may then 
complete the brief survey.   
Once everyone has finished a volunteer from BREC will role a die to randomly determine 
which one task will be used to determine your payment.  Even though you are making 19 
decisions, only one will affect your payment.       
The container will then be filled with the colored balls according to the “#” column for the 
randomly selected task and one ball will be randomly drawn from the container.  If your chosen 
option for the selected task does not have a checkmark for the color of the ball drawn, you will 
lose $35 from the $50 you are receiving for participating in this study.   
Below is an example.  Suppose the following task was randomly selected and the person 
had chosen option F by marking it as shown below.   
BALLS # 
OPTIONS 
Place a round sticker on the letter option of your choice. 
A B C D E   
Red 10             
Orange 30            
Yellow 60            
If an orange ball is drawn from the container, then this person as well as anybody else who 
chose options B, E, or F would be paid the $50 participation payment because options B, E, and 
F all contain a checkmark for orange.  Anyone selecting options A, C, or D would receive the 
$50 participation payment minus $35 (for a total of $15).  
After the drawing, a researcher will come to you to verify what you have earned.  The 
researcher will give you a claim slip that you can use to collect your payment as you leave.  
When called, you will hand the claim slip to a researcher who will ask you to sign a receipt in 
exchange for your money.  You will then drop your response booklet, survey, and marker in a 
large box.  This process is designed to ensure that no one including the researchers can ever 
know the responses of any individual.     
If you have any questions about the experiment, please ask now.   
Otherwise, you may open your response booklet and begin.  Keep in mind that you cannot 
go backwards through the booklet and should not answer the survey until you have completed 
the booklet. 
  
 